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introduction 
When recently asked what he thought was one of the greatest problems 
plaguing the federal judiciary, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito responded 
by saying the “crushing” workload faced by his former colleagues on the courts 
of appeals.1 The Justice’s statement should come as no surprise. For close to 
half a century, judges and scholars alike have spoken out about a critical 
problem facing the federal appellate courts: the caseload has grown at an 
exponential rate.2 Whereas in 1950 circuit judges had to review an average of 
only 73 appeals,3 their modern counterparts must decide more than four times 
as many, with an average of 329 appeals per annum today.4 Indeed, it is on 
 
1.  Interview by David F. Levi with Samuel A. Alito, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., 
in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 15, 2010); see Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: 
Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 324 (2011) (assessing 
the effects of the increasing workload in federal appellate courts). 
2.  See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function 
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 (1969) (“[T]he federal appellate 
caseload is likely to continue to increase for the foreseeable future and . . . the resulting 
congestion poses a serious threat to the institutional role of the courts of appeals.”); Harry 
T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the Federal Courts: A 
Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 877 
(1983) (“As the work load of the federal courts and the burdens imposed on federal judges 
have increased during the last two decades, concern over the effect of these trends on the 
administration of justice has risen apace.”); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s 
Bargain: The Federal Courts and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 473, 473 (2009) (arguing that “skyrocket[ing]” caseloads in the federal courts 
have caused a “crisis”); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., 
Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, Kastenmeier Lecture at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School (Sept. 15, 1992), in 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3 (“Simply put, 
time and again the nation has looked to the federal courts to handle a larger and larger 
proportion of society’s problems. . . . [A]s a result of people looking to the federal courts 
those courts have become overburdened and the system has become clogged.”). 
3.  See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 
(1998). It should be noted that this figure includes data from the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and Court of Claims. Id. 
4.  To arrive at this figure, I took the sum of the filings in the geographic circuit courts and the 
Federal Circuit in Fiscal Year 2012 and divided by the total number of judgeships, 179. In 
Fiscal Year 2012, there were 57,501 filings in the geographic circuits. See Judicial Business of 
the United States Courts: 2012 Annual Report of the Director, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., at tbl.B 
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices 
/B00Sep12.pdf. In that same period, there were 1,381 filings in the Federal Circuit.  
See Historical Caseload, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT (2013), http://www.cafc.uscourts 
.gov/images/stories/Statistics/historical%20caseload%20graph%2083-13.pdf. Those figures 
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account of this precipitous rise in caseload that the federal courts of appeals 
have so often been said to face a “crisis in volume.”5 
Attempts to assess and ameliorate this crisis have come from the bench, 
bar, and academy. Several committees and commissions have studied the 
problem, including, most notably, the Commission on Revision of the Federal 
Court Appellate System (also known as the Hruska Commission) in the 
1970s,6 the Federal Courts Study Committee in the 1980s,7 and the 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (or 
the White Commission) in the 1990s.8 Throughout this time, prominent 
jurists including Chief Justice William Rehnquist,9 Judge Henry Friendly,10 
Judge Jon Newman,11 and Judge Richard Posner12 have weighed in from the 
bench, writing that the rising caseload stands to harm the court system as we 
know it. Scholars including Paul Carrington and Daniel Meador have similarly 
 
together, divided by 179, come to approximately 329 appeals per judgeship. See also infra 
Subsection III.B.2 (discussing the contribution of senior judges). 
5.  See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2011) (noting the 
“voluminous” literature on the “crisis of volume”). 
6.  Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972); see, e.g., R. SAM GARRETT, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33189, PROPOSALS IN THE 109TH CONGRESS TO SPLIT THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, at CRS-2 to -3 (2006). 
7.  Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-109, 102 Stat. 
4642, 4644-45 (1988). The efforts of the Federal Courts Study Committee led in 1990 to the 
creation of another committee, the Committee on Long Range Planning, which sought to 
plan for how the “accelerating pace of social change,” including the increased workload of 
the courts, would affect the federal judiciary. Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, ADMIN. 
OFF. U.S. CTS. 1 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications 
/FederalCourtsLongRangePlan.pdf. 
8.  Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491; see GARRETT, supra 
note 6, at CRS-2 to -3. 
9.  See Rehnquist, supra note 2. 
10.  See generally Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 
634 (1974) (evaluating a number of proposals for managing the growing caseload of the 
federal courts of appeals). 
11.  See generally Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the 
Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1989) (arguing that “the volume of federal 
court cases is growing at an unacceptable rate,” thereby “threaten[ing] the quality and 
nature of the federal judiciary,” and that “new approaches to structuring federal jurisdiction 
are needed”). 
12.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). 
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written extensively about the predicament,13 discussing measures the courts 
could undertake to preserve their fundamental nature as the caseload mounts. 
These efforts to better understand our court system in the face of this crisis 
helped create, and ultimately define, the field that is now called “judicial 
administration.”14 
Over the past thirty years, no one has contributed more to this field than 
two court scholars together—William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds. 
Through a series of critical articles,15 Richman and Reynolds were able to 
pinpoint the precise effects of the caseload crisis, both on litigants and the 
system as a whole. Furthermore, they were able to show the interplay of these 
various effects, providing a holistic account of the problem in a way that no one 
 
13.  Indeed, Professors Carrington and Meador, along with Professor Maurice Rosenberg, wrote 
one of the earliest accounts of the caseload crisis (from which Richman and Reynolds no 
doubt drew the title of their book). PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE 
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976). Carrington and Meador made other scholarly 
contributions separately. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 2; Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to 
Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 603 (1989); Daniel J. Meador, Enlarging Federal Appellate Capacity Through District 
Level Review, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233 (1998). 
14.  More recently, the phrase “judicial administration” has fallen out of favor. There is some 
concern, it seems, that the term may sound insufficiently theoretical to academic ears, and as 
such, some presently describe the work as pertaining more generally to federal courts.  
If one is looking for a larger frame for this type of scholarship, the “new legal process” 
may be most apt. The aim of judicial administration is to assess how courts operate and how 
that operation creates substantive law and effectuates the principles of our judicial system—
an aim that fits well into a school that closely studies the functioning of governing 
institutions and their relative capabilities. Many thanks to Judge Guido Calabresi for this 
insight. 
15.  See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication 
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981) 
[hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform]; William L. Reynolds & William M. 
Richman, Justice and More Judges, 15 J.L. & POL. 559 (1999); William L. Reynolds & William 
M. Richman, The New Certiorari Courts, 80 JUDICATURE 206 (1997); William L. Reynolds & 
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation 
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); William L. 
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
1290 (1996); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice, Bureaucracy, 
and Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623 (1988); William M. Richman & William L. 
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand 
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996) [hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, Elitism]; 
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of 
Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1985). 
21.LEVYBR_FINAL.DOCX 4/20/2014  5:28:33 PM 
judging justice on appeal 
2391 
 
else had done.16 Their recent book, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts 
of Appeals in Crisis,17 stands as a culmination of their earlier work,18 bringing 
together vital analysis of the caseload crisis, the ways in which appellate review 
has suffered as a result of that crisis, and potential solutions. More broadly, 
Injustice on Appeal stands as one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful 
accounts of the largest problem facing the federal judiciary today. 
Part I of this Review assesses the major contributions of the book—namely 
Richman and Reynolds’s detailed discussion of the effects of the courts’ 
staggering caseload. As the Injustice authors were among the first to point out, 
the courts’ increased workload has meant that only a fraction of all appeals now 
receive what one might call “traditional” appellate adjudication in the form of 
oral argument, consideration by a judge and his or her clerks, and then a 
published opinion. Instead, the vast majority of appellate litigants currently 
receive no oral argument,19 have their cases worked up primarily by staff 
attorneys,20 and then have their cases disposed of via unpublished order or 
summary judgment.21 Injustice delineates the losses associated with each of 
these case-management developments, but then makes two larger, profound 
points. First, it is not simply that some cases receive less judicial attention 
overall, but rather that some kinds of cases receive less attention—namely, 
social security cases, prisoner cases, and criminal cases (or, as the authors point 
 
16.  For example, in Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand 
Tradition, Richman and Reynolds assess the combined effects of not being afforded the 
opportunity to have an oral hearing and then not receiving a published opinion. See 
Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 15. 
17.  WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013). 
18.  Richman and Reynolds note at the outset of their book that Injustice draws upon their 
earlier scholarship. See id. at ix. 
19.  Specifically, in Fiscal Year 2012, 81.2% of cases decided on the merits went without oral 
argument. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 4, at tbl.S-1, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/S01Sep12.pdf. 
20.  Richman and Reynolds note that “the great bulk of [the staff attorneys’] work consists of 
writing memoranda in the non-argument cases” and that “[o]ften a draft of a proposed 
opinion accompanies the memo, and almost as often the court adopts the staff attorney’s 
proposed disposition and draft opinion with minor changes.” RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra 
note 17, at 107. 
21.  Specifically, in Fiscal Year 2012, 81.4% of cases decided on the merits were decided by 
unpublished order or opinion. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 
4, at tbl.S-3, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables 
/S03Sep12.pdf. 
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out, cases brought by parties who are arguably the most vulnerable in our legal 
system). Second, by deciding which cases will receive significant judicial 
attention and which cases will receive very little, the courts of appeals have 
begun to resemble certiorari courts—a move they have made entirely on their 
own. Part I concludes by assessing the significance of these two contributions 
and their theoretical implications. 
While the Review by and large concurs with Richman and Reynolds’s 
diagnosis of the problems facing the federal judiciary, it parts company on the 
cure. Part II assesses the final portion of Injustice, which provides the authors’ 
would-be prescriptive measures. Specifically, Richman and Reynolds argue 
that the obvious solution to the problem of an overworked judiciary is simply 
to increase the size of the judiciary—and substantially, by as much as one 
hundred percent.22 While increasing the resources of a resource-constrained 
court system might seem like a fitting response, the authors’ proposal falls 
short in two respects. First, it fails to provide any sort of detail about how this 
change would be implemented, including whether it would involve increasing 
the size of the existing circuits or adding new circuits altogether, and whether it 
would happen gradually or in a condensed timeframe. Problems afflict all of 
these implementation mechanisms, and because the authors fail to articulate a 
full proposal for expanding the judiciary, it is possible that Richman and 
Reynolds’s solution might amount to a cure that is worse than the disease. 
Yet beyond these ground-level practical problems is a greater problem 
still—the problem of political reality. By the authors’ own account, proposals to 
expand the bench have stalled because the judiciary has been opposed to them 
and Congress has not been moved to act on its own.23 Barring an explanation 
of why the motivations of both branches have changed—something Richman 
and Reynolds do not provide—it seems highly unlikely that these same 
branches would now support a plan to add over 150 new judges (at an initial 
cost of over $150 million24) any time soon. 
The final Part of the Review therefore focuses on more fruitful avenues for 
improving the judiciary. In particular, Part III considers ways of enhancing 
“non-traditional” review through means such as altering judicial voting 
 
22.  See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
23.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 167-72. 
24.  This figure is based on Richman and Reynolds’s own estimate. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 17, at 179 (citing Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S.2774, Federal Judgeship 
Act of 2008, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2008), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles 
/ftpdocs/94xx/doc9470/s2774.pdf). 
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practices and increasing the specialization of staff attorneys. It also sets out 
potential ways to improve appellate adjudication more generally, focusing on  
the use of visiting judges, senior judges, and other so-called “housekeeping” 
practices of the courts that together have a significant impact on tens of 
thousands of cases each year.25 
The Review concludes that although Richman and Reynolds may not have 
provided the optimal prescription for improving the state of the federal courts 
of appeals, their book serves a critical function by providing the most 
comprehensive account of the problems plaguing those courts today and over 
the past several decades. That account stands to make a significant 
contribution on its own, and will no doubt inspire a second wave of scholars to 
contemplate one of the key questions for the judiciary and the academy: how 
can we improve the quality of appellate review in this country? 
i .  diagnosing the problem in the courts of appeals: an 
account of the caseload crisis  
Injustice on Appeal begins “BCE” or “before the caseload explosion.”26 The 
authors briefly trace the history of the appellate courts, reminding the reader 
that the courts as we know them today did not come into existence until little 
more than a century ago, with the Evarts Act of 1891.27 Richman and 
Reynolds’s key observation is that during the judiciary’s salad days, judges 
could decide appeals at their leisure. Indeed, through the middle of the 
twentieth century, judges provided what we might call traditional appellate 
review, or what the authors dub the “Learned Hand Treatment” after the 
famed judge of the Second Circuit, to nearly every case on their docket.28 
Specifically, this meant that appeals were almost universally given oral 
argument and decided by published opinion, and that law clerks played a 
limited role in the decisionmaking process.29 
 
25.  See infra Section III.B. 
26.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 1. 
27.  Id. at 2 (citing Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)). 
28.  Id. at 3. 
29.  Id. I say “almost universally” as a “small number of appeals” were decided from the bench 
directly after oral argument. Id. (quoting MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 93-94 
(1970)). 
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But as the authors point out, traditional appellate review soon gave way as 
the caseload began a period of rapid growth. In 1960 the number of cases filed 
in the geographic circuit courts was 3,899;30 by 1970 that figure had swelled to 
11,662;31 by 1980 it had more than doubled to 23,200;32 and by 2010 it had 
more than doubled again to 55,992.33 The book devotes little space to what 
caused the expansion, but it briefly identifies a few contributing factors. First, 
Richman and Reynolds touch on the general growth in population.34 
(Specifically, in 1960 the population of the United States was just under 180 
million and within twenty years it had grown to over 225 million.35) As the 
authors succinctly put it, “more people generate more litigation and more 
economic activity, which in turn creates more and more complex litigation.”36 
A second factor is the increased legislative activity of Congress, causing, in 
turn, an increase in federal law—both in amount and in complexity.37 And a 
third factor is the heightened activity of the courts themselves—particularly the 
Warren Court—which read “many new federal rights” into the Constitution.38 
The combination of at least these factors created a seismic change in the 
caseload of the federal courts. To sharpen the point, Richman and Reynolds 
note that “over the past fifty years, the circuit courts’ caseload has increased by 
 
30.  Id. (citing COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 3, at 
16 tbl.2-4). 
31.  See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 3, at 16 
tbl.2-4. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. 83 tbl.B (2010), http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/Judicialbusinespdfversion.pdf. 
34.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 3. 
35.  See 2010 Census on Population and Housing, Population and Housing Unit Counts, United 
 States Summary, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph 
-2-1.pdf. 
36.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 4. 
37.  Id.; see also Carolyn Dineen King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 956-57 (1991) 
(“What are the reasons for this increase in the caseload and what are its results? . . . The 
legislation in the 1960s which increased rights and created mechanisms for obtaining them 
has resulted in an explosion of litigation, particularly in the federal courts.”); Rehnquist, 
supra note 2, at 3 (stating that the “body of federal law has grown geometrically since 1958” 
and noting the “increasing complexity of the issues now handled by the federal courts”). 
38.  Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, FED. CTS. STUDY COMM. 5 (1990), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf; see RICHMAN & 
REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 4. 
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1436 percent, a more than fourteenfold increase.”39 By contrast, the number of 
judgeships has only grown from 68 to 167, meaning that the workload per 
judgeship has increased by almost 600% in this time.40 
Given the magnitude of the increase in caseload vis-à-vis the increase in the 
number of judges, the federal appellate courts clearly could not have continued 
to give every case a leisurely review. And in fact, beginning in the 1960s, the 
courts began developing a series of “case-management” measures to cope with 
the increase in volume. The main portion of Injustice is devoted to 
documenting and assessing these case-management tools and the effects of 
their implementation. 
First, as Richman and Reynolds detail over several chapters, federal 
appellate judges began publishing full opinions in a smaller percentage of total 
cases.41 Judges have often reported that writing full-length, precedential 
opinions is the most time-consuming aspect of their job, with some sources 
suggesting that opinion-writing takes up over half of judges’ working hours.42 
It should come as no surprise, then, that as the caseload began increasing, 
judges considered whether some cases could be disposed of in a shorter (and 
faster-to-execute) form. The upshot was a 1964 decision by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States that only opinions of “general precedential 
value” should be published,43 meaning that cases that would not give rise to 
 
39.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
40.  Id. at 5-6. It is important to note that this figure ignores the contribution of senior judges. 
As the number of judgeships has increased, so too has the number of non-active judges who 
help defray the burden of the workload by taking on a partial or even a full workload. 
Indeed, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, senior judges—in both 
the district and circuit courts—currently take on approximately fifteen percent of the work 
of the federal courts each year. See Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Judges, ADMIN. OFF. 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
41.  See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 10-82 (describing and assessing judicial 
publication plans). 
42.  E.g., DANIEL J. MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: 
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 549 (2d ed. 2006) (“The written 
opinion is the most labor intensive feature of the appellate process—studies have found that 
judges spend over half their time working on opinions . . . .”). 
43.  Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. 11 
(1964). Of course, “publication” is something of a term of art in this context. When first 
employed, the term had a straightforward usage—opinions that were “published” were 
recorded in the Federal Reporter, and unpublished opinions were omitted. See Boyce F. 
Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 184-86 (1999). Indeed, 
this is one of the reasons unpublished opinions could not be cited to initially—the thought 
was that it was unfair to allow citation to a document that would not be easily accessible to 
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such opinions could be decided by more succinct unpublished orders.44 Soon 
after, each of the circuit courts devised its own rules for when cases could be 
decided by unpublished disposition.45 Within only a few years, more cases 
were being decided by unpublished disposition than by published opinion46—a 
fact that remains true today.47 
Second, judges began to hold oral argument in a smaller percentage of total 
cases.48 Following opinion writing, oral argument is one of the most time-
intensive components of a court’s business. There is, of course, the direct cost 
of oral argument, which is typically thirty minutes per case in many circuits.49 
This is a significant amount of time if the court were to hold argument in all or 
even the majority of cases, considering that the average number of filings per 
judgeship is 329 and that appellate judges hear cases in panels of three (thereby 
effectively tripling that figure).50 And yet, the indirect costs associated with oral 
argument are arguably just as great. Beyond the time judges spend in the 
courtroom questioning the parties is the time spent preparing lines of inquiry 
 
all of the parties or the public. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 59 (discussing 
these initial fairness concerns); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: 
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 940, 945-46 (1989) (citing congressional hearings in which this fairness point 
was made). Now that these opinions can be found in LexisNexis, Westlaw, and other 
electronic databases, and, in turn, now that they can be cited, the distinction between 
published and unpublished opinions is not so great. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 
17, at 59; see also FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (requiring that all circuit courts permit the citation of 
any unpublished opinion issued on or after January 1, 2007). The main point now is that 
unpublished opinions are not binding, so while they technically may be cited in court 
documents for persuasive effect, they are still not precedential. 
44.  See THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS 127 (1994) (citing Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, supra note 43, at 11). 
45.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 15. 
46.  See Reynolds & Richman, The Price of Reform, supra note 15, at 586 (finding, based on data 
provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, that of 12,419 opinions issued by 
the federal courts of appeals, 4,699, or 38%, were published, and 7,720, or 62%, were 
unpublished). 
47.  See supra note 21. 
48.  See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 83-94 (documenting this trend). 
49.  See Levy, supra note 1, at 355-60 (describing the oral argument practices of the D.C., First, 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, and finding that, although this figure does vary from 
circuit to circuit, cases are typically allotted fifteen minutes of oral argument per side, or 
thirty minutes total). 
50.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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and, though easy to overlook, the time most judges spend traveling to the 
courthouse from another city and possibly another state at multiple points 
throughout the year.51 Accordingly, as with traditional opinions, one could 
predict that when the courts became inundated with cases, they would begin to 
limit the share of cases that would receive oral argument. Indeed, beginning in 
1968 with the Fifth Circuit, the courts did just that.52 This change in appellate 
process was formalized with a 1979 amendment to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 34, which authorized the resolution of an appeal without oral 
argument when a three-judge panel determined that the appeal was 
“frivolous,” the dispositive issue had already been “authoritatively decided,” or 
the decisionmaking process “would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument.”53 And today, the vast majority of appeals that are decided on the 
merits are decided solely on the briefs.54 
Third and finally, judges began to rely more on what the authors call 
“additional decision makers”—particularly law clerks and staff attorneys—to 
assist in performing their official responsibilities.55 The increase in the number 
of law clerks or “elbow clerks”56 allotted to each appellate judge roughly 
tracked the increase in caseload. As Richman and Reynolds note, appellate 
judges went from receiving one clerk in the 1930s to two in 1969, three in 1979, 
and four today.57 Additionally, beginning in 1973, courts began to receive 
funding to hire staff law clerks, as distinct from elbow clerks, to assist with 
certain kinds of cases including pro se and habeas appeals.58 Within less than a 
decade, Congress authorized the creation of official staff attorney offices to 
 
51.  See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the 
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 (1986). 
52.  Joe Cecil & Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases Without Argument: A Description of Procedures in 
the Courts of Appeals, FED. JUD. CENTER 2 (1985), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/dcwadpca.pdf/$file/dcwadpca.pdf. 
53.  FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). Congress received the amendment from the Chief Justice on May 1, 
1979. 125 CONG. REC. 9,366 (1979). 
54.  See supra note 19. 
55.  See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 97-111 (outlining the growth in the 
number of additional decisionmakers in the courts of appeals and evaluating the costs and 
benefits associated with judicial reliance on them). 
56.  Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1446 (1983). 
57.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 97-98. 
58.  Staff Attorney Offices Help Manage Rising Caseloads, FED. CT. MGMT. REP. (Admin. Office of 
the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2004, at 1, 3. 
21.LEVYBR_FINAL.DOCX 4/20/2014  5:28:33 PM 
the yale law journal 123:2386   2014  
2398 
 
further assist with the caseload.59 The authors report that as of 2008, there 
were five hundred staff attorneys—or nearly three for every judgeship—
helping to defray the work in the federal appellate courts.60 
In addition to documenting these marked changes in the federal appellate 
process, Richman and Reynolds identify the key costs associated with them. 
Beginning with limiting the publication of full-length opinions, the authors 
argue that relying to a great extent on unpublished opinions ultimately lessens 
judicial accountability, in that such dispositions generally receive less scrutiny 
(by other members of the bench and the public) and are often unsigned, 
meaning that no single judge has to take ownership of the decision.61 The 
authors further make the case that disposing of so many appeals without 
precedential opinions adversely affects the development of the law, in that it 
places the majority of decisions outside the realm of stare decisis.62 As a result, 
they argue, these cases may not be decided as carefully (because the panel 
knows they are not binding on future cases) and, in the opposite direction, the 
absence of these datapoints in the Federal Reporter may hinder the proper 
decision of future cases (because future panels will have fewer examples to 
draw upon or distinguish from).63 
Turning to the reduction in oral argument, Richman and Reynolds assess 
the value of having in-person arguments in each case, thereby highlighting the 
losses attendant on limiting such arguments as a timesaving technique. Those 
benefits include ensuring that the judges are fully informed about the facts of 
the case and the relevant caselaw when reaching a decision,64 and providing 
legitimacy to their decisionmaking (by showing the parties and the public that 
they have considered the matter at hand).65 Finally, Injustice delineates the 
problems that come with having additional decisionmakers in the circuit 
courts, focusing mostly on “overdelegation”—i.e., having staff, be they law 
clerks or staff attorneys, take on what are truly Article III responsibilities (such 
as drafting opinions) without sufficient oversight.66 
 
59.  Id. 
60.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 113. 
61.  Id. at 42. 
62.  Id. at 47. 
63.  Id. at 47-48. 
64.  See id. at 85-86. 
65.  Id. at 89. 
66.  Id. at 99-103, 110-13. 
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By canvassing the vast changes in the appellate courts in the last sixty years 
and the effects of those changes, Injustice makes a significant contribution to 
the literature on court administration and indeed, to the collective 
understanding of the federal judiciary more generally. One might question 
some of the authors’ conclusions—specifically regarding how great the losses 
attendant on these case management techniques truly are—or whether the 
authors sufficiently consider the benefits that also come with such 
techniques.67 Yet overall, these chapters by Richman and Reynolds arguably 
provide the most comprehensive account of how the federal appellate courts 
have been changed in the face of the workload increase in the past few decades. 
But beyond these points, Injustice makes a greater contribution still by 
showing the macro effect of these case-management decisions—namely, that 
certain kinds of cases tend to receive traditional appellate treatment while 
others tend to receive less (and, indeed, little) judicial attention. In the words 
of the authors, “a litigant in an ‘important’ antitrust or securities case, one who 
is represented by serious counsel, will get the full Learned Hand Treatment” 
(meaning oral argument, careful consideration by a panel of judges, and a 
published opinion).68 In contrast, the authors note that “[a] litigant who is 
poor, without counsel, and with a boring, repetitive problem . . . can expect 
only . . . second-hand treatment . . . .”69 Examples of cases that consistently 
receive what the authors call “track two” treatment include those involving 
prisoner rights, social security, and criminal convictions70 (and though the 
authors do not specifically mention them here, immigration and pro se cases 
generally receive this limited treatment as well71). By combining this insight 
with their earlier analysis, Richman and Reynolds are able to argue 
 
67.  For example, on the matter of unpublished opinions, the costs identified by Richman and 
Reynolds were far greater before the existence of LexisNexis and Westlaw (which today 
make most “unpublished” opinions available) and before all circuits were required to permit 
citation to these opinions. See supra note 43. With the advent of both changes, the costs 
associated with unpublished opinions are perhaps not so great. On the other side of the 
ledger, the benefits of having unpublished opinions still seem as great as they once were. 
Though Richman and Reynolds do not think these dispositions serve a sufficiently useful 
function, others certainly do. For a persuasive article about the utility of unpublished 
opinions for some types of cases, see Martin, supra note 43. 
68.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 119-20. 
69.  Id. at 120. 
70.  Id. at 119. 
71.  See Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges 
Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 417 
(2013). 
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convincingly that because they receive less in the way of judicial resources, the 
track two set of litigants also receive less in the way of overall decisionmaking 
quality. 
Accordingly, it is not simply that some litigants bear the costs of the 
judiciary’s decision72 to pare down the process that it generally affords 
appellants, but rather that certain litigants bear the majority of these costs. In 
this way, the case-management practices of the courts have something of a 
disparate impact on the different appellants who come before them, with, as 
the authors argue, those who are socially and economically disadvantaged 
receiving a lower quality of justice.73 From the authors’ standpoint, the federal 
courts that exist for the benefit of society now underserve a huge swath of the 
population—the same swath that is underprivileged more generally.74 It is this 
inequality (reinforcing a broader inequality) that stands as the “injustice” in 
Injustice on Appeal. 
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of Richman and 
Reynolds’s contribution with this analysis. They pinpoint a critical issue with 
the way justice is delivered in the appellate courts—one that impacts thousands 
of parties each year.75 This will undoubtedly help pave the way for numerous 
articles examining court process, as their previous work has already done,76 
which will only add to our substantive understanding of the federal courts. 
Now here again, the authors could have done more with their analysis—
specifically, to address the fact that there are arguably valid reasons for the 
courts to treat these parties differently, in light of the caseload pressures that 
 
72.  I use the term “decision” in a qualified way. Unless the courts were willing to experience a 
significant increase in their backlog, it is unclear that they had an option beyond paring 
down the appellate process received by at least some parties. 
73.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 120. 
74.  Id. at 178, 227. 
75.  There were 57,501 appeals filed in the geographic circuit courts in Fiscal Year 2012. See 
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 4, http://www.uscourts.gov 
/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012.aspx. 
76.  For examples of scholarship that relies on Richman and Reynolds’s findings about the 
disparate treatment of litigants in the federal courts of appeals, see Penelope Pether, 
Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; Or Why the Federal 
Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 955 (2009); and David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the 
Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005). 
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courts face.77 For example, as the authors themselves intimate, many of the 
classes of cases that receive less judicial attention raise repetitive legal claims,78 
thereby making them prime candidates for a limited form of review. Still, 
Injustice fundamentally adds to our knowledge of the appellate courts, 
regarding both the changes that those courts made and the ramifications of 
those changes (both individually and cumulatively). 
Finally, in making these critical substantive contributions, Injustice makes 
an important process-based point as well. The authors note that in creating 
what essentially amounts to a two-track system of treatment, the judges have 
decided which cases to give full attention to and which cases at least initially 
will be handled primarily by staff. Richman and Reynolds point out, quite 
powerfully, that the courts of appeals now resemble certiorari courts, with the 
judges essentially having the meta-ability to decide what they will decide.79 
This is a critical change from the judiciary’s earlier days in two respects. First, it 
has a fundamental impact on the nature of our court system. It is one thing not 
to guarantee review by the Supreme Court, as that usually amounts to a second 
review of the initial district court decision. But to not guarantee full review by 
even the intermediate appellate courts means that some portion of district 
court decisions will be virtually unchecked, thereby calling into question the 
very notion of an appellate system.80 Second, this shift has separation-of-
 
77.  Elsewhere I have argued that some of the prior work of Richman and Reynolds, along with 
the work of others, does not sufficiently take into account the legitimate reasons for why 
different types of cases receive different treatment in the appellate courts during this time of 
constrained judicial resources, such as that some cases, including sentencing and 
immigration cases, tend to raise a narrow set of issues on appeal that often can be fairly 
adjudicated without oral argument and do not need a full opinion to resolve. See Levy, supra 
note 71, at 439-40. 
78.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 120. 
79.  Id. at 118. 
80.  I refer to district courts here as the first-instance decisionmakers to mirror Richman and 
Reynolds (who discuss appellate review of the trial courts in this section of the book, see id.). 
Of course, appellate courts also review appeals from agencies. See generally HARRY T. 
EDWARDS, LINDA A. ELLIOTT & MARIN K. LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF 
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS (2d ed. 2013) (describing the various 
standards of review appellate courts apply when reviewing district court decisions and 
agency actions). Some appeals from agencies have already been through at least one layer of 
review before they come to the appellate courts. For example, immigration cases are heard 
by Immigration Judges and then by the Board of Immigration Appeals before going on to 
the federal courts of appeals. As such, one could query whether not having an additional 
layer of review at the federal appellate stage is quite so problematic. That said, some have 
questioned the thoroughness of these non-Article III reviews. See, e.g., Guchshenkov v. 
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powers implications. As the authors note, the appellate courts have shifted 
towards a certiorari model without the assent of Congress.81 This is in direct 
contrast to the way the Supreme Court’s docket became largely discretionary,82 
and is arguably a usurpation of the legislative role.83 
While these are vital points, one can again argue that the authors’ analysis 
is incomplete. Specifically, though the authors acknowledge that in dubbing 
the circuits “certiorari courts” a generation ago they had given in somewhat to 
hyperbole,84 they fail to explore the limitations of their analogy. For example, 
even cases that receive track two treatment are still decided by the court, with 
the judges still involved in the decision (even if not to the full extent they are 
involved in track one cases). That said, the point is well taken—as Injustice 
shows, the circuit courts have altered the way that they review cases and have 
done so without the explicit authorization of Congress. 
In short, the majority of Injustice provides court scholars and judges with 
key ways to think about how the courts have changed over the last half century. 
In so doing, Richman and Reynolds have offered invaluable knowledge about, 
and insight into, the federal courts. 
i i .  an impractical cure:  expanding the federal bench 
Injustice does not conclude after its compelling descriptive analysis, 
however. The last several chapters turn to the normative, with the authors 
prescribing what the courts should do to solve their current problems. And it is 
here that the book falls short, with a recommendation that is incomplete at best 
and inconsistent with its earlier analysis at worst. 
Having spent ten chapters thoroughly diagnosing the problem of the 
federal courts as being too many cases for the number of judges, the authors 
 
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (describing a decision by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals as a “characteristically perfunctory opinion affirming the 
immigration judge”). Accordingly, it seems reasonable to say that even with additional 
layers of review of some agency decisions, not having a final review at the federal appellate 
stage would be a great loss in process. 
81.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 118. 
82.  See Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)). 
83.  Cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 315 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing the 
Court’s decision to review sentences for excessiveness without explicit authorization from 
Congress as “judicial usurpation with a vengeance”). 
84.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 119. 
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promise to spend the final four recommending what appears to be a natural 
solution: increasing the size of the federal appellate bench.85 And indeed, 
because Richman and Reynolds have provided such a comprehensive and 
compelling account of the caseload crisis, the reader is anxious at this point to 
learn how that crisis can be abated. Unfortunately, though, the remedy is more 
assumed than proposed. The book devotes only a few paragraphs to a 
subsection entitled “The Obvious Solution: More Judges,”86 and nowhere in 
that space actually makes a direct call for that solution. Instead, the authors 
discuss how overworked the current judiciary is, simply reinforcing the 
message of the previous chapters. 
To be clear, the authors not only fail to make an affirmative case for their 
solution, they fail to specify precisely what their solution is. This is particularly 
problematic because there are significant decisions to make as far as how one 
should implement a judicial expansion. First, by how much exactly should the 
bench be increased? Second, how should the increase occur—by adding judges 
to the existing circuits or by creating new circuits altogether? Third, should 
this expansion take place gradually or as quickly as possible? What’s more, 
decisions at any of these junctures are open to criticism. For example, in 
deciding how the increase should occur, one could argue, as some have, that 
adding to the existing circuits would make those courts less efficient and harm 
the collegiality of their members.87 As it stands, many commentators already 
question the functionality of the current Ninth Circuit;88 generating ten more 
such circuits hardly seems ideal. On the other hand, the creation of new circuits 
poses problems of its own. Carving up existing circuits is a daunting task at 
best (again, one need only look to discussions about the Ninth Circuit89). And 
in light of the fact that there are already concerns about too many circuit splits 
 
85.  Id. at 165. 
86.  Id. at 165-67. 
87.  See Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 
187, 188 (1993); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 71; J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 
1173 (1994). 
88.  See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 3, at 29. 
The concern over the Ninth Circuit’s functionality has led lawmakers to propose splitting 
the court numerous times. See Jonathan D. Glater, Lawmakers Trying Again to Divide Ninth 
Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/19/politics 
/19court.html (quoting Senator John Ensign, a proponent of the split, as describing the 
Ninth Circuit as “too large and too unwieldy”). 
89.  See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 3, at 52-53. 
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that are left unresolved by the Supreme Court,90 the country would arguably 
face even greater disuniformity of federal law with more circuits.91 The authors 
consider some of these objections later in Injustice, when critiquing concerns 
about expansion more generally.92 But without having a clear sense of what the 
authors are truly proposing93 and how that proposal would be implemented, it 
is impossible to evaluate whether their would-be solution might actually be a 
cure that is worse than the disease.94 
Instead of detailing a solution, the authors quickly pivot to why such a 
solution has not already come to pass.95 The main culprit, according to the 
authors, is the judiciary itself. Specifically, Richman and Reynolds argue that 
appellate judges have helped keep their own numbers down through, among 
other means, lobbying efforts (both writing and speaking out against creating 
new judgeships)96 and even directly voting against recommendations to add 
more judgeships to their circuits.97 
The fact that appellate judges appear to be resisting the idea of increasing 
the size of the bench raises the question of why, in light of the sizeable 
caseload, they are not embracing the possibility of an expansion. Here, 
Richman and Reynolds provide several accounts, beginning with those that 
touch upon the quality of the bench. For example, the authors note the 
expressed concern of numerous judges that there simply would not be a 
 
90.  See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-09 (1987). 
91.  See Newman, supra note 87, at 188. 
92.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 173-206. 
93.  On the matter of how many judges to add, the authors seem to lean towards adding as many 
as 150 new judges, though this is not stated explicitly. Rather, they discuss how much it 
would cost to add as many as 150 new judgeships, which they argue is the amount “required 
to handle the docket without resort to the shortcuts.” RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, 
at 179-80. 
94.  The decision to avoid giving direct substantive answers to these questions would be more 
understandable if the authors had instead provided a process-based response—namely, a 
discussion about how these questions should be addressed and by whom. For example, by 
following earlier models, see id. at 132, 137-38, a commission of scholars and practitioners or 
even judges could be appointed to make recommendations on these points. The book is 
silent on this possibility as well. 
95.  Indeed, the last time Congress created a new federal appellate judgeship was nearly a 
quarter of a century ago. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, 
§202, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098-99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
96.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 167-68. 
97.  Id. at 171. 
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sufficient number of qualified applicants to fill an increased number of 
judgeships and that some of those who are qualified might no longer be 
interested since the prestige of the office would have diminished.98 The 
accounts then extend to the stability of the law. Specifically, Richman and 
Reynolds discuss the fear on the part of the bench (as touched on above) that 
adding judgeships would create inconsistencies in the law within circuits or 
increase those that exist between circuits.99 Finally, the authors describe the 
concern regarding the financial cost of implementing a significant expansion in 
judgeships (a cost of approximately $1 million per new judge or as much as 
$150 million altogether).100 
The authors then respond with mixed success to what they see as the 
judges’ reasons for opposing an expansion of the bench. They are on their 
strongest footing when they counter the concerns, lodged by several prominent 
judges,101 that an increased bench would necessarily result in a lower quality 
bench. Here, Richman and Reynolds point to the numbers, noting that in 1960 
there were 4,205 attorneys for every circuit judgeship and in 2010 there were 
5,600 attorneys for every circuit judgeship.102 They persuasively argue that 
even if the bench were expanded considerably, there would still be a robust 
number of lawyers per judgeship, meaning that there would certainly be a 
sizeable enough pool in which to find qualified applicants.103 
The authors are less successful when they dismiss concerns about the 
effects an expanded judiciary would have on the coherence of the law. Focusing 
on adding judgeships to existing circuits, Richman and Reynolds claim that 
“[t]here is simply no evidence that increasing the number of judgeships within 
a circuit reduces the stability of circuit law.”104 While this statement might be 
technically true, more than two-thirds of the appellate bench reported that they 
 
98.  Id. at 174-75. 
99.  Id. at 184-90; see also id. at 190-93 (discussing the empirical evidence and logical gaps in 
such arguments). 
100.  Id. at 179. 
101.  The authors specifically cite to Judge Newman. See id. at 174 (citing Newman, supra note 87, 
at 187-88). Other judges who have made similar arguments include Judge Tjoflat and Judge 
Wilkinson. See Tjoflat, supra note 87; Wilkinson, supra note 87. 
102.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 174. 
103.  Though not directly used as such, these numbers also speak to prestige concerns; if the ratio 
of attorneys to judges were not altered too greatly, then theoretically the office would 
remain just as prestigious as it would remain just as difficult to be selected for the position. 
104.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 184. 
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believed the maximum number of judges for a court to “function[] as a single 
decisional unit,” creating a cohesive body of law, is between eleven and 
seventeen.105 It is not difficult to imagine why this would be so. As the White 
Commission detailed, judges of smaller circuits can read the opinions of all of 
their colleagues before they are published—thereby providing the opportunity 
to correct “inadvertent inconsistenc[ies]” in the law and also keeping everyone 
abreast of new legal developments.106 Additionally, once a circuit becomes 
quite large, as in the case of the Ninth, it becomes no longer practicable to  
hold en banc proceedings as a single, unified court.107 It seems quite possible 
that not being able to have the full court review any number of issues would 
lead to a less coherent body of law. There are some studies that call into 
question just how much of a problem expanding the existing appellate  
courts would be for intracircuit consistency, and Richman and Reynolds  
are right to cite to them.108 But it is too strong to state, as the authors do, that 
this concern is “the great red herring”109 of the expansion debate. 
But beyond the problems that one can locate within their counter-
counterarguments—that is, the arguments the authors preemptively make 
against the counterarguments that one could raise against expanding the 
judiciary—lies a fundamental problem with the main argument itself. Richman 
and Reynolds suggest that the size of the federal bench should be increased 
dramatically, and yet they provide no account of how this proposal could ever 
be realized. According to the authors, the state of the judiciary has not 
improved to date because of the positions of the relevant actors. Specifically, 
Congress, at best, appears to have little interest in expanding the bench 
(indeed, it has not created a single new appellate judgeship since 1990110) and 
 
105.  See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 3, at 29. 
106.  Id. 
107.  The Ninth Circuit famously holds en banc proceedings with a subset of the court. See 9TH 
CIR. R. 35-1 to 35-4. 
108.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 184 (citing the Federal Courts Study Committee 
Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 302(c), 104 Stat. 5104, 5104 (1990); 
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); and Report on Federal Circuit Size, 
APP. PRAC. J. & UPDATE, 1993, at 3). 
109.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 183. 
110.  See U.S. Court of Appeals, Additional Authorized Judgeships, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships 
/docs/appeals-judgeships.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); see also Federal Judgeship Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §202, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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the judiciary actively opposes it. And yet, the solution proposed in Injustice 
relies on these very same branches, for it requires Congress to create more 
judgeships and the judiciary to support the action (or at least not actively 
oppose it). 
This inconsistency calls to mind what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
have described as a problem of “incentive-compatibility.”111 That is, the 
diagnosis supplied by Richman and Reynolds relies on an account of the 
judiciary’s motivations that is in direct contrast with the motivations that 
presumably would need to be present for the solution to be realized.112 If 
realpolitik is what has halted proposals to expand the judiciary to date, then 
there needs to be a compelling account of what has changed or what could 
change if that same proposal is being put forward as the solution today—an 
account that the book does not provide.113 
One response to this concern is that perhaps the authors are simply taking 
on the position of reformers, arguing what would be best without concern for 
constraints.114 And yet, Richman and Reynolds reject at the end of their book 
what is arguably the second “obvious” solution to the caseload problem—
namely, reducing the caseload by limiting jurisdiction—on the ground that this 
proposal is a “pipe dream.”115 As they write, “Congress makes changes to 
federal jurisdiction in response to political pressure from constituents and 
contributors. It is not about to make radical cuts in federal jurisdiction to 
accommodate the judiciary’s desire to remain small . . . .”116 Here, the authors 
recognize (and care about) the problems posed by the political reality inherent 
in some would-be solutions; they simply fail to carry that recognition over to 
their own. 
 
111.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 
1744 (2013). 
112.  Id. To be clear, I am only suggesting that Richman and Reynolds’s proposed solution shares 
some of the characteristics of the incentive-compatibility problem, not that it is a direct 
example of the “inside/outside fallacy” that Posner and Vermeule identify in their essay. Id. 
at 1744. 
113.  One potential argument is that the publication of Injustice itself will provide the necessary 
agent for change. It would be wonderful if this were ultimately to be the case. Yet it is 
difficult to be optimistic in light of the fact that Congress and the courts have not heeded 
earlier cries for reform. 
114.  See Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 
1172 (2006). 
115.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 226. 
116.  Id. 
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Bound up in the intellectual consistency problem117 is the feasibility 
problem itself. The main proposal of Injustice is one that will not be realized in 
the foreseeable future. It is therefore unsatisfying, if not disheartening, to be 
left with this proposal as the only way out. The task, then, is to take up the 
contributions of the first portion of the book and begin to consider other ways 
to improve appellate review. 
i i i .  new avenues for improving the judiciary 
As the previous Parts describe, Richman and Reynolds were among the 
first to thoroughly diagnose the problem facing the federal appellate courts—
namely that the workload has become unmanageable, and has caused appellate 
review of most cases to suffer. But the authors ultimately suggest an impossible 
cure: massively increasing the size of the appellate bench. 
It is worth recognizing that Richman and Reynolds have not been alone in 
suggesting lofty solutions. Other court scholars and judges writing within the 
first wave of scholarship on judicial administration similarly suggested grand 
fixes—either by agreeing that the size of the bench must be increased118 or 
proposing that the cases coming into courts be reduced, such as by limiting or 
even eliminating diversity jurisdiction.119 It is not hard to see why such 
solutions have been put forth time and time again, despite the fact that 
Congress has consistently resisted them.120 A large-scale problem of the federal 
 
117.  Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 111, at 1745. 
118.  See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many 
Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 53 (calling upon Congress to double the size of the federal 
appellate judiciary). 
119.  See Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Gridlock: The Case for Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction, 10 
BROOKINGS REV. 34, 34-39 (1992); Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose 
Time Has Passed?, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14, 14 (1989); Friendly, supra note 10, at 640-41; Irving R. 
Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as the Greatest Innovator, 
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 267-68 (1988) (calling diversity jurisdiction a “plague” on the 
federal courts and proposing reform); see also POSNER, supra note 12, at 176 (finding that an 
economic analysis would support less diversity jurisdiction than we currently have); 
Newman, supra note 11, at 771-76 (offering proposals to restructure state and federal 
jurisdiction to reduce the caseload burden on the federal courts). 
120.  With respect to the bench, as noted earlier, Congress has not created a new judgeship since 
1990. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. With respect to jurisdiction, Congress has 
shied away from abolishing diversity jurisdiction—instead adopting measures such as 
increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement to limit case volume, as in the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 
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judiciary would seem to demand a large-scale solution. Moreover, singular 
solutions have the benefit of intellectual tidiness; they are both relatively easy 
to identify and easy to argue for. It is far more difficult to get into the weeds of 
appellate adjudication, as it were, and carefully determine the combination of 
smaller steps that must be taken to improve review, and then make a 
compelling case for that combination. 
And yet, in light of the fact that the current problems facing the courts need 
some kind of solution, a more nuanced approach to improving appellate review 
is precisely what is called for. In the remainder of this Review, I consider the 
main challenge for the second wave of court administration scholars—how to 
ameliorate the current state of the courts—by examining non-argument review 
and then court practices more generally. 
A. Non-Argument Review 
A prime concern regarding non-argument review, as identified by Richman 
and Reynolds, is that some cases (and really, some litigants) are failing to 
receive thorough judicial consideration.121 As a result, it is more likely that these 
cases, as compared to cases that receive what the authors call a traditional 
review, will have legal and factual errors that go uncorrected or confused points 
of law that go unclarified. Richman and Reynolds respond to this concern by 
proposing a solution that would do away with the need for non-argument 
review altogether. With that option as a non-starter, however, we must 
reframe the task at hand. Instead of finding a way to eliminate non-argument 
review, we must find ways of improving it. Specifically, these ways should 
focus on the source of many of the judgments in non-argument cases, namely 
the staff attorneys, and the oversight of that source, namely the review of 
judges. 
1. Training and Hiring of Staff Attorneys 
The vast majority of cases in the federal appellate courts are diverted onto a 
non-argument track. Specifically, of the approximately 38,000 appeals decided 
on the merits in Fiscal Year 2012, nearly 28,000 were decided on the briefs 
 
(1988). For a useful discussion of Congress’s decision not to abolish diversity jurisdiction, 
see Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 306-10 (3d Cir. 1993). 
121.  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 119-20. 
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alone.122 In this class of cases, staff attorneys generally play two critical roles. 
First, they serve as the primary gatekeepers in many circuits by reviewing cases 
and deciding if any should be routed onto the argument calendar and given 
traditional appellate treatment.123 Second, staff attorneys serve as primary 
drafters; in most circuits, many orders in non-argument cases are drafted in 
the first instance by these attorneys.124 
Though there has been much discussion of improving appellate review by 
expanding the bench, there has been virtually no discussion of how to enhance 
review in this set of nearly 28,000 appeals per year. Based on extensive 
qualitative research on several of the circuit courts,125 a few key suggestions 
seem particularly promising. 
First, as I have noted elsewhere, while a few of the circuit courts have staff 
attorneys who specialize in a particular subject matter—say, immigration law—
many do not.126 The benefits of specialization are straightforward: as members 
of courts that rely on specialization point out, by developing expertise in one or 
a few areas of law, staff attorneys are better able to identify errors in decisions 
below as well as cases that raise particularly complex issues and thus need to be 
placed on the argument calendar.127 It would not be difficult for more circuits 
 
122.  See Judicial Business of the United States Courts, supra note 4, at tbl.B-1, http://www 
.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B01Sep12.pdf. 
123.  Laural Hooper, Dean Miletich & Angelia Levy, Case Management Procedures in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, FED. JUD. CENTER 11-12 (2d ed. 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf 
/lookup/caseman2.pdf/$file/caseman2.pdf. 
124.  See Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 76, at 1669. 
125.  Specifically, between 2010 and 2014, I conducted over fifty in-person semi-structured 
interviews, lasting between approximately thirty and ninety minutes, with judges, staff 
attorneys, chief mediators, and clerks of court of the D.C., First, Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals. In order to maintain confidentiality, this Review does not refer to 
the name of any interviewee or the location of any interview. It does, however, include dates 
and it should be noted that interviewees who were interviewed on different dates refer here 
to different people. Finally, it should also be mentioned that the notes from these interviews 
are on file with the author and have been reviewed by the staff of the Yale Law Journal. 
126.  See Levy, supra note 71, at 443-44. 
127.  See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case Study 
of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
429, 432-33 (2009). There is a separate question of whether more specialization could 
improve appellate adjudication outside of non-argument review. The federal appellate 
courts have relied upon specialization both at the panel level, as with the Fifth Circuit’s oil 
and gas panels, and at the court level, as with the Federal Circuit, and there are those who 
have argued that the courts would benefit from even more specialization overall. See, e.g., 
Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter 
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to encourage specialization in a host of substantive areas128—for example, 
sentencing, employment law, tax, and habeas appeals. Just which areas would 
be appropriate for specialization would depend on the circuit’s docket (a circuit 
that only receives a handful of immigration appeals per year would not need a 
staff attorney who focuses on immigration law alone). And this is not to 
suggest that the optimal workload should not include some variety in subject 
matter so as to remain engaging over time (it might make sense for one staff 
attorney in a given circuit to specialize in, say, two or three types of appeal). 
But the larger point remains: given that a considerable number of circuits 
currently fail to have staff attorneys develop an expertise in a subset of areas of 
law, increasing the extent of specialization in those circuits could be one 
promising way to improve the quality of review in non-argument cases. 
Second, while some circuits (such as the First) have staff attorneys serve for 
at least several years, many (such as the Fourth) have attorneys who generally 
are given only one- or two-year terms.129 Just as specialization can be valuable 
because it increases one’s expertise, so too can a substantial tenure. Or to make 
the point somewhat finer, if one has concerns about the kind of initial review 
performed by a staff attorney with only one or two years of experience, a 
natural solution is to ensure that more staff attorney positions have lengthier 
terms or are even career appointments, as in other parts of the Clerk’s Office. 
 
Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 475-82 (1983). Though specialization is a topic 
that has already been discussed in the literature, whether the courts should increase 
specialization and, if so, at what levels, is another topic that is ripe for further scholarly 
inquiry. 
128.  The types of appeals that would seem to most easily lend themselves to specialization are the 
ones that have a particular subject matter in common. It is to be expected that as one 
becomes an expert in immigration law, for example, one can then make better 
recommendations about how to dispose of a given immigration appeal. The more difficult 
question is whether one can develop an expertise based on other factors—namely, whether 
the appellant has counsel. Some circuits have staff who focus on pro se appeals, see Levy, 
supra note 1, at 330, despite the fact that these appeals can raise claims in just about any area 
of law. In earlier work I conducted an informal survey of pro se appeals from a few-week 
period in 2011 and found cases on every topic from employment discrimination to 
bankruptcy to the Fourth Amendment. See Levy, supra note 71, at 437. The argument for 
specialization in pro se appeals is perhaps that the “methodology” is the same—a staff 
attorney who works on these cases must learn how to sift through the materials and 
construe arguments in a light most beneficial to the appellant. Whether it is as helpful to 
have staff who specialize in pro se cases as cases based on subject matter is a question worth 
further study. 
129.  See Levy, supra note 71, at 444. 
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While neither of these proposals is as sweeping as abolishing diversity 
jurisdiction or significantly expanding the bench, their promise lies in their 
feasibility. They would not necessarily require any additional funding130 or any 
action from Congress more generally. These proposals could all be 
implemented by the judiciary itself and their implementation would be fairly 
straightforward. Moreover, given that staff attorneys are the first movers in the 
adjudication of the majority of cases in the federal appellate courts, it is vital to 
contemplate how to ensure that their review is of the highest quality possible. 
Focusing on the organization of the staff attorney offices—through both 
specialization and length of tenure—is a promising place to begin.131 
2. Voting Behavior of Judges 
The previous set of proposals focused on the initial source of non-
argument review in the form of staff attorneys; I turn now to improving the 
check on that initial source, the judges. Though staff attorneys make 
recommendations about which cases should be placed on the argument 
calendar, and indeed draft the orders in tens of thousands of cases per year, 
three appellate judges ultimately review and must sign off on those decisions.132 
Putting the judge in the role of manager (and not initial drafter) is not an 
unfamiliar practice. In many chambers across the country, the norm is that law 
clerks will write the first draft of opinions and the judges will review the work 
 
130.  It might be the case that by having staff attorneys for longer terms, the salaries of the 
attorneys on average would be slightly higher. But there would be no massive expense, such 
as the cost of adding new judgeships. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
131.  It is worth noting that Richman and Reynolds oppose the current degree of specialization 
and use of career appointments among staff attorney offices on the ground that they believe 
both increase the risk of overdelegation. Specifically, the concern is that if judges have more 
confidence in the staff attorneys, they will apply even less scrutiny to the recommendations 
of those attorneys. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 110-13. For my own part, I 
highly suspect that the increase in the quality of the staff attorneys’ judgments and decisions 
to send cases to argument will outweigh any losses caused by lowered scrutiny of those 
decisions (to the extent this occurs). Yet this would be another area ripe for scholarly 
inquiry. Similarly, one might be concerned that with the advent of specialization and career 
appointments, staff attorney positions would no longer resemble clerkships and therefore 
draw a smaller (and perhaps less talented) applicant pool. I am inclined to think that, as in 
response to the prestige concerns over expanding the bench, it would still be possible to find 
a sufficient number of talented and interested people to fill the positions, but again, this 
could be another area ripe for scholarly inquiry. 
132.  See Levy, supra note 1, at 346. 
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product.133 Though from time to time there has been some unease about the 
scope of the law clerks’ role,134 the dynamic between law clerks and judges is 
generally accepted because of the belief that there is considerable oversight by 
the judges. The concern with the dynamic between the staff attorneys and the 
judges, by contrast, is that the judges do not carefully review the work product 
in non-argument cases.135 
One way to help ensure a thorough review of these proposed orders is 
through altering voting practices. Currently, in some of the circuits, judges 
review proposed orders on their own and then submit their vote in the case 
(and whether they would like to make any changes to the order), typically via 
fax or e-mail.136 The norm in these circuits is to conduct the voting process in 
serial or “round robin” fashion.137 This means that if a particular non-argument 
panel is assigned twelve cases to decide, the panel will be divided so that each 
judge—Judge 1, Judge 2, and Judge 3—receives four at the outset. The judges 
then vote on those cases and pass them on to the next judge (and so Judge 1 
passes her voting sheet on to Judge 2, Judge 2 to Judge 3, and Judge 3 to Judge 
1), and then the process repeats once more.138 The benefits of this kind of 
voting system are plain: it is orderly and helps ensure that cases are decided 
efficiently as each judge may be “nudged along” by the knowledge in most 
instances that at least one of his or her colleagues has already voted on the case. 
The problem, of course, is that this kind of practice naturally creates some path 
dependence. When voting, each judge already knows how one colleague has 
voted in one-third of all cases and how the other two panel members have 
voted in another third of all cases. The concern, then, is that if a judge sees that 
two of her colleagues have already voted to accept the proposed order of the 
staff attorney, she will then conduct a less thorough review of the order (and 
 
133.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 101. 
134.  See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys 
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6 (2007). For a thoughtful discussion of concerns 
about the dynamic between law clerks and Supreme Court Justices (which no doubt 
inspired the aforementioned article), see generally ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, 
SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (2006). 
135.  See Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 15, at 276 (describing how, in a typical track-
two case, “actual judge time probably consists of limited review of the staff 
recommendations”). 
136.  See Hooper et al., supra note 123, at 18-19. 
137.  Levy, supra note 1, at 348, 350. 
138.  See Newman, supra note 127, at 434. 
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the case more generally) than if she were conducting the review without this 
knowledge. 
One could respond to this concern by noting that the non-argument voting 
procedure is not so different from the voting procedure employed in conference 
following oral argument. In the latter situation, the judges discuss the case 
together and announce how they will vote and so again, most judges know 
how at least one other judge would decide the case before casting a vote. But in 
argument cases, there is little concern about the thoroughness of judicial 
review—by and large the expectation is that the judges have already read the 
briefs and any memoranda prepared by their law clerks, and certainly they have 
just heard the oral arguments of counsel. In the non-argument cases, there 
simply is not the same assurance that the judges have spent much time 
considering the case. 
Given this concern, one potentially promising solution is to alter the voting 
pattern of the judges. As it currently stands, at least one circuit—the Third—
purposefully does not utilize serial voting.139 Rather, each judge reviews the 
case on his or her own and then submits a voting sheet to the presiding judge 
of that panel.140 According to one Third Circuit judge, the decision to forgo 
serial voting was deliberate and made so as to minimize the extent to which 
judges would be influenced by their colleagues when casting votes.141 This 
process could be taken one step further, with each judge submitting his or her 
vote to the Clerk’s Office so that even the presiding judge would not be 
influenced by the other panel members (and then, once all of the judges had 
voted, the Clerk’s Office could inform the panel of the results). This kind of 
“blind” voting procedure would be easy to implement across the circuits and 
would help ensure that the judges are carefully considering each case and 
reviewing each drafted order. 
Again, none of these proposed solutions are overarching; they are, to be 
sure, somewhat limited in scope. But in this context, this type of limitation 
should be understood to be a virtue and not a defect.142 It is the limited nature 
of the proposals—and, attendantly, the fact that they carry no new financial 
burden and require no action by anyone outside the judiciary—that makes 
them feasible. As such, they can actually stand to improve appellate review. 
 
139.  Levy, supra note 1, at 351. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Many thanks to Robert Quigley for this formulation. 
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B. Court Practices Generally 
Stepping beyond non-argument review, the courts of appeals have 
implemented a range of practices and procedures to respond to the rising 
caseload. Some of these practices relate directly to the judges themselves—
either by allocating judge hours where they are most needed, through the use 
of visiting judges, or by increasing judge hours, through practices relating to 
senior judges. There are also broader practices that relate to everything from 
mediation to filing deadlines. Given that those practices and procedures seem 
likely to remain in some form, it is worth theorizing about whether they can be 
improved as well. 
1. Practices Relating to Visiting Judges 
One way in which circuits facing particularly high workloads cope is to 
import visiting judges from other courts for a short period of time.143 The 
visitors can be other circuit court judges, district judges, or other Article III 
judges altogether. As a result, a criminal appeal brought in the Second Circuit 
could be decided by two Second Circuit judges and a judge from the United 
States Court of International Trade. Though this practice is not widely 
discussed in the literature, it is fairly significant; overall, visiting  
judges participated in nearly 4,000 cases between September 2011 and 
September 2012.144 
Richman and Reynolds raise several concerns about the use of visiting 
judges—including that their presence may disturb the collegiality of the court 
and that resident circuit judges may be resistant to having non-resident judges 
help shape their law.145 The proposal put forth by Richman and Reynolds 
would largely do away with the need for visitors, as there would simply be 
more judges for each court. But again, as it is unlikely that such a proposal will 
 
143.  See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2012). 
144.  Specifically, visiting judges participated in 3,794 of the cases in the year ending in 
September 30, 2012. See Case Participations in the U.S. Courts of Appeals on Cases 
Submitted on Briefs or Orally Argued During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 
2007 Through 2012, ADMIN OFF. U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics 
/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2012/case-participation-summary-pages-september 
-2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
145.  See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 17, at 96. 
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be realized in the near future, the key question becomes, how can we improve 
this practice? 
One promising place to begin is in better understanding the dynamic 
between “home” judges and judges sitting by designation. Interestingly, there 
are differing views on what kinds of judges make the most useful visitors. For 
example, some appellate judges have stated a preference for having in-circuit 
district judges sit by designation, as they are the ones most familiar with circuit 
law.146 Accordingly, the argument goes, they can be most helpful in identifying 
an error below or an area of law that would benefit from development through 
a published opinion. Other appellate judges prefer sitting with visiting circuit 
judges, on the ground that those judges feel like “colleagues”147 (and in a 
related vein, some appellate judges have noted that district judges can be overly 
deferential to the other judges on the panel148). Another reason in favor of 
outside circuit judges is that they are used to the job, and have the time needed 
to do the work required of a sitting.149 Still others talk about the benefits of 
having Article III judges who do not sit on district courts or ordinary courts of 
appeals, such as judges from the United States Court of International Trade, sit 
by designation—namely that those judges do not have their own, competing 
body of law150 and that, given their relatively low workload, these judges are 
best positioned to accept a writing assignment and therefore serve as real 
members of the court.151 
In light of how many panels include a judge sitting by designation, and in 
light of the concerns raised by the different classes of these judges, the reliance 
on visitors is clearly one promising area for research. It would be helpful for 
court scholars to explore, through qualitative research, just how the dynamics 
between the various kinds of judges play out in panel decision-making. 
Furthermore, it would be useful for scholars to assess, through quantitative 
 
146.  See, e.g., Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 14, 
2013). 
147.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 12, 
2013). 
148.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (July 31, 
2013). 
149.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (July 31, 2013). 
150.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Mar. 6, 
2012). 
151.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Jan. 30, 
2014). 
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research, if the rates of affirmance or denial change depending on whether the 
visiting panel member is a district judge from that circuit or not. If, based on 
these different methodologies, it became clear that one type of visitor helped 
contribute to a more thorough review than another, this would be critical 
information for circuits to have and could lead to improved appellate 
adjudication. 
2. Practices Relating to Senior Judges 
In addition to visiting judges, the other critical set of judges who can assist 
with the caseload is to be found within the circuit: senior and senior-eligible 
judges. There are two ways in which these judges can increase the productivity 
of the rest of the court. First, by taking senior status as soon as they are eligible, 
judges free up seats to be filled by newly appointed judges.152 And second, once 
judges have taken senior status, they can decide to continue working at near or 
even full capacity.153 It is worth assessing ways of encouraging both. 
On the first point, it is important to keep in mind that judges are not 
obligated to “go senior” at the moment when they become eligible. Rather, 
they have the option of taking senior status whenever they reach the age and 
service requirements of the “Rule of Eighty” (meaning that the judge’s age and 
years of service total at least eighty, and, furthermore, that the judge is at least 
sixty-five years old and has been a judge for at least ten years).154 Accordingly, 
judges can—and often do—wait to elect senior service for several years after 
they are eligible. From a productivity perspective, this is a great loss. By going 
senior, a judge vacates an active judgeship, which can be filled by someone 
else.155 If the now-senior judge continues at even only fifty percent capacity, the 
 
152.  See 28 U.S.C. § 371(d) (2012). 
153.  The flexibility of senior judges in setting their number of sitting weeks seems to be a matter 
of custom; it does not appear to be explicitly authorized by statute. However, one can find 
references to this practice in the Federal Judicial Center’s monograph on the case 
management procedures of the federal appellate courts. See Hooper et al., supra note 123, at 
127, 149, 166, 172, 177, 187, 218. 
154.  See Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common 
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 536 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006)). 
155.  Of course, the benefits of having a judge take senior status can only be realized if the 
vacancy is actually filled. At the time of publication, there were sixteen vacancies in the 
courts of appeals (or nearly ten percent of the number of judgeships). See Judicial Vacancies, 
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies 
.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
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court has the equivalent of one-and-a-half judges during this time instead of 
only one. If each year even only a handful of judges took senior status as soon 
as possible instead of delaying for several years, the benefit would be the 
equivalent of adding several new judgeships without any need for 
congressional action. 
The question, then, is how to make taking senior status as soon as one is 
eligible as desirable as possible. Some incentives already exist. Beginning with 
financial considerations, unlike an active judge, a senior judge can accept 
payment for approved teaching beyond the standard outside income cap of 
fifteen percent of annual salary.156 Turning to the job itself, in at least the 
Second Circuit, it is a frequent practice for a panel to offer a senior judge the 
choice of one or more opinions to write.157 But there are also quite a few 
disincentives. A senior judge is not permitted to participate in en banc 
proceedings unless he or she was part of the panel that originally decided the 
case or was an active judge when the en banc proceedings began.158 
Furthermore, there are logistical and status disadvantages as well. For example, 
I have been told that in some circuits, taking senior status means giving up 
current chambers and accepting less desirable chambers or being relegated 
toward the ends of the bench at court ceremonies.159 It would be valuable to 
study the practices in different circuits surrounding taking senior status—
specifically, whether there are ways of eliminating some of the disincentives, of 
creating new incentives, or even of simply establishing a new norm of 
assuming senior status when eligible. There might be some practical 
constraints—for example, given space constraints in certain courthouses, it 
might not be possible to have senior judges retain their old chambers—but it 
would still be worth studying what progress could be made in having more 
senior-eligible judges take senior status.160 
 
156.  2 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY §1020.25(b)(7)  
(2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02C-Ch10.pdf. 
Additionally, a senior judge’s salary is not subject to deductions for FICA and Medicare 
taxes. See Block, supra note 154, at 538-39 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 3121(i)(5) (2006) and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 409(h) (2006)). 
157.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 
151. 
158.  See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012). 
159.  See Interview with a Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, supra note 
151. 
160.  Although there has been some valuable scholarship on the legal status of senior judges, see, 
e.g., Betty Binns Fletcher, A Response to Stras & Scott’s Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 
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On the second point, it is likewise important to bear in mind that senior 
judges decide each year how great a workload they will take on.161 A judge 
could assume, say, a twenty-five percent workload or the full workload of an 
active judge. Plainly, the more sittings a senior judge volunteers for, the greater 
the benefit to the rest of the court. It would therefore be valuable to study the 
policies around treatment of senior judges, and to what extent additional 
service can be encouraged. In some circuits, for example, senior judges are 
given great latitude in choosing when they will sit. Specifically, a judge might 
say she would be happy to sit an additional week but only if that week could be 
the last in February. The Chief Judge or the Clerk’s or Circuit Executive’s 
Office then tries to accommodate those requests whenever possible to gain the 
additional help.162 Court scholars would do well to investigate practices like 
this one to see if, as an empirical matter, they are effective in encouraging 
senior judges to assume a greater workload. Additionally, scholarship is needed 
on the normative component of such policies. Regarding scheduling, if judges 
are allowed to request certain sitting dates, then the oral argument panels 
necessarily will not be randomly configured. Is it worth a slight erosion in 
perfect randomness if such a policy can actually achieve greater productivity? 
There is a strong argument to be made that it is, but again, court scholars need 
to further study these questions. 
The key point is that assistance from this set of judges is entirely a net 
benefit.163 By providing for additional judge hours—either by vacating a seat or 
by assuming a greater workload—senior-eligible and senior judges can 
 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2007), there has yet to be any in-depth scholarly inquiry into the 
more practical aspects of senior status, including what policies could encourage senior-
eligible judges to assume senior status. 
161.  See supra note 153. 
162.  See supra note 150; Interview with a senior member of the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Apr. 30, 2012); Interview with a senior 
member of the Clerk’s Office of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (June  
18, 2012). 
163.  Of course, senior judges are not cost-free. Provided that they contribute “substantial service” 
to the court, they continue to receive office space and the support of law clerks and 
secretaries. See Block, supra note 154, at 539-40. If a senior-eligible judge could be 
encouraged to take senior status, say, a year earlier than she otherwise would and her seat is 
quickly filled, there would be the extra financial cost in that year of one judge’s chambers 
and staff. Additionally, if a senior judge could be encouraged to take on, say, an eighty 
percent workload instead of a fifty percent workload, there would be the extra financial cost 
in that year of an additional law clerk. 
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contribute significantly to the productivity of the courts. Accordingly, there 
should be scholarly inquiry into the practices surrounding this set of judges. 
3. Remaining Court Practices 
Beyond relying on visiting judges, appellate courts engage in a range of 
practices in an effort to increase their efficiency and thus reduce their backlog 
of cases. These practices range from the process-oriented, such as requiring 
that a portion of all cases go through mediation before proceeding to some 
form of judicial review,164 to the logistical, such as altering the timeframe in 
which briefs are to be filed.165 Moreover, these practices vary from circuit to 
circuit, and have varied within each circuit from time to time. For example, the 
Third Circuit includes appeals filed by pro se litigants in its mediation plan, 
while other circuits typically do not.166 Turning to filing deadlines, the Second 
Circuit recently adopted a new practice in which the parties effectively propose 
their own briefing schedule—a practice that reduces requests for extensions of 
time (and the administrative burdens attendant on such requests).167 
It would be easy to dismiss changes to any individual practice as simply 
“housekeeping”168 measures, but in toto, they can have a significant impact on 
the appellate process. Accordingly, the second wave of court scholarship should 
include study of the process-oriented components of appellate review 
including, among others, the various mediation practices—just how efficient 
the different plans are and just how much they lead to (or detract from) the 
satisfaction of the parties.169 Likewise, there should be further study of the 
logistical components of appellate procedure—including whether shifts in 
 
164.  See Robert J. Niemic, Mediation & Conference Programs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A 
Sourcebook for Judges and Lawyers, FED. JUD. CENTER 3 (2d ed. 2006), http://www.fjc.gov 
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/MediCon2.pdf/$file/MediCon2.pdf. 
165.  See Jodi S. Balsam, The New Second Circuit Local Rules: Anatomy and Commentary, 19 J.L. & 
POL’Y 469, 516-21 (2011) (describing recent changes made by the Second Circuit to its rules 
regarding briefing schedules). 
166.  See Levy, supra note 1, at 343. 
167.  See 2D CIR. R. 31.2; Balsam, supra note 165, at 516-17. 
168.  See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 
GA. L. REV. 909, 914 (1990). 
169.  The current Federal Judicial Center report on mediation is an excellent resource, though, by 
admission, the purpose of the main portion of the report is to “describe[] some similarities 
and differences” between the mediation programs of the different circuits, not to “assess the 
merits of any approach.” See Niemic, supra note 164, at 6. 
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timing, and in who sets the timing, create net gains, again along the 
dimensions of efficiency and party satisfaction. To be sure, these are in-the-
weeds inquiries; yet they are precisely the inquiries that must be undertaken to 
improve the quality of appellate review that cases in the federal courts receive. 
conclusion 
The story of Injustice on Appeal is one of ever-shrinking resources—the 
courts of appeals have had to perform the same set of critical functions with 
fewer and fewer means per appeal to do so. Yet there is another story here as 
well about the resources of the academy. Legal scholars in general spend a great 
deal of time devoted to theory and doctrine. And yet, we spend relatively few 
resources on studying the institutions that make up our legal system, 
particularly on the twin positive and normative questions about how they 
actually function and how they should function. Richman and Reynolds’s 
work serves as a call to arms for the academy to take up these critical inquiries. 
Ultimately, Richman and Reynolds have provided a great deal for court 
scholars following in their wake. They have carefully and thoughtfully 
delineated the largest problem facing the federal judiciary in the past several 
decades—one that affects tens of thousands of litigants each year. With the 
quality of overall judicial review in doubt, it is for the academics to carefully 
study—using both qualitative and quantitative tools—the use of court 
practices. From judicial voting rules to visiting judges, from mediation to staff 
organization, there are numerous areas ripe for academic review about how to 
improve judicial review. In Injustice on Appeal, Richman and Reynolds have laid 
the groundwork; it is up to the next generation of court scholars to find  
the way. 
